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ACTION AND ITS REPRESENTATION IN THE MINDS OF STORY CHARACTERS Findings from children's discourse*

The paper is concerned with states of consciousness which young narrators ascribe to their story characters – agents of actions changing referential reality (heroes of the narrative line) and observers of these actions (participants in the narrative field). Two hundred and fifty-six preschoolers (from 3 to 7) were studied. The children recounted to peer listeners the adventures of the same heroes in three picture books. There were two versions of each picture book, the difference being the relationship between subjects in the forefront and background of the picture. Each narrator recounted two adventures, one which took place in the presence of a peer (child) and the other in the presence of a non-peer (adult). The research design was balanced for age, gender and order of narration in the two experimental variants.

The first analysis established which of the subjects on the picture background were brought into the narrative line and which were located in the narrative field. The next analysis focused on the mental states ascribed by the narrator to participants in the narrative field. We did not observe any mental attributions by three-year-old narrators. But 4–7-year-old narrators imputed to child and adult participants different kinds of interpretations of the heroes' actions. These interpretations were treated by the narrator as incomplete, wrong or possible representations of narrative reality. Depending on the narrator's treatment, the narrative line was either developed in greater detail in the landscape of action or developed only in terms of the landscape of consciousness.

Introduction

There has been considerable controversy over the years as to how much young children know about mental states and how readily they attribute them to others. The traditional view has been that they are, in effect, behaviorists, who either misconstrue mental events as behaviors or do not recognize the existence of mental processes at all (Lillard & Flavell, 1990, p. 731). According to Lillard and Flavell (*ibid*), there are three groups of evidence consistent with the traditional view.

* The article is based on a paper presented by the author at the International Conference "Children's discourse from a narrative perspective" (Kazimierz Dolny, September 17–21, 1998, Poland). The presented data came from studies supported by Grant 1 HO1F 074 10 from the State Commission for Scientific Research in Poland. Address for correspondence: Barbara Bokus, Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Stawki 5/7, 00-183 Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: bokus@sci.psych.uw.edu.pl

Some studies show that:

1) young children may externalize the mental, interpreting what adults consider internal processes as external (Piaget's results [1929] in the context of more recent studies by Selman [1980] or Harris [1985]).

Other studies show that:

2) children define mental verbs in terms of ensuing external events (e.g. Miscione, Marvin, O'Brien & Greenberg, 1978, Wellman & Johnson, 1979);

Still other studies show that:

3) children frequently describe people rather in physical than in mental terms (e.g. Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Foulkes, 1987).

In contrast to this view, there is a growing body of research indicating that children do in fact know something about mental life and understand themselves and others as psychological beings having mental states such as beliefs, desires, emotions and intentions (e.g. Shields, 1979; Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Wellman, 1992; Taylor, 1996). According to Meltzoff (1995, p. 839), recent research on children's understanding of mind has focused on two questions:

a) mentalism: how and when do children begin to construe others as having psychological states that underlie behavior?

b) representation: how and when do children come to understand mental states as active representations of the world and not simple copies or imprints of it? Researchers have been studying children's grasp of the distinction between real and mental, real and pretend, real and apparent, what is said and what is meant, and what is seen and how it is mentally represented (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1990, pp. 1–2). Many of these acquisitions are linked developmentally and appear to reflect the same newly acquired insight into the nature of the mind. There is not full agreement as to whether we can speak of a child's theory of mind or rather about a less structured collection of evidence on children's understanding of mental states (Taylor, 1996). Leaving aside this recent controversy, we focus on studies of mental states attributed to others in the story context.

Research dealing with children's understanding of mental life has recently extended to include studies on the development of children's narrative competence (e.g. Lucariello, 1990; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995; Bokus, 1996a). An important first step was made twenty years ago by Macnamara, Baker and Olson (1976) and supported later by Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985). They showed that a story context facilitates children's understanding of presuppositions of mental states conveyed by the verbs "know", "remember", "forget", "think", even if the story does not provide direct information about such mental states. Listening to stories helps children acquire competence with verbs referring to mental life, that is, competence in understanding subjective reality.

Bruner (1986) has introduced the term subjunctive reality to denote a possible but not a certain reality that is not entirely determined by the speaker, but is partially created by the listener (see also Eco, 1979). The discourse processes that are used to subjunctivize reality are fundamental to an understanding of a dual landscape of narrative: one of the world of action depicted in the story, the other of the world of consciousness in the minds of the story characters as well as in the mind of the narrator. To understand a story, the listener has to comprehend both landscapes simultaneously, the landscape of reality and the landscape of consciousness. In Astington's (1990, p. 153) words, this is the heart of

understanding narrative and this is what the 4-year-old, but not the 2-year-old, can achieve. Once children are able to make presuppositions about mental representations in other minds, they can understand the dual landscape of narrative.

A related question formulated by Astington (ibid, p. 167) is: when do children start to produce stories with a dual landscape? While many studies deal with children's understanding of action and consciousness in stories they listen to (Britton & Pellegrini, 1990), how duality is constructed in children's narratives is still open to question (Bokus, 1996b). This paper is an attempt to approach this question. It is concerned with states of consciousness which young narrators ascribe to their story characters. Let us start from a distinction between story characters as subjects of the narrative line, and as subjects of the narrative field, a distinction basic to this analysis. The narrative line presents the course of changing referenced reality over time. Agents of the actions that change referenced reality are the subjects of the narrative line. Other subjects that are not engaged directly in changes of referenced reality, figuring as it were on a second plane, or backdrop, are regarded as participants in the narrative field (Bokus, 1991, 1992). Our previous studies (Bokus, 1991, 1996a) have shown that narrators introduce field subjects in some way related to subjects in the narrative line, as follows:

1) spatial relation	}	(coded in the landscape of action)
2) observer – observed relation		
3) evaluator – evaluated relation	}	(coded in the landscape of consciousness)
4) explainer – explained relation		

In this paper we explore how narrators ascribe to field subjects interpretations of what is happening in the narrative line (the latter two relations presented above).

Problem

Narrative field subjects can have different relations with narrative line subjects (the heroes of the story) in terms of symmetry. They can make up a symmetrical structure, i.e. a peer structure, or they can form an asymmetrical one, i.e. a non-peer structure. The narrator ascribes to field subjects attempts to interpret states and actions of the narrative line subjects (the heroes).

The first question is:

Does the narrator differentiate these interpretations depending on field participants' status, i.e., whether they are related to the heroes symmetrically (as child to child) or asymmetrically (as adult to child)?

Field participants are presented by the narrator as subjects who know something, who think about something, etc. Mental states (conveyed by the verbs "know", "think", and similar ones) are not only subjective (i.e., belonging to one or another individual), but are also objective, i.e., they make reference to something in the external or internal world. They have a representational content in Searle's (1983) terms, they are about something, here: about the situations of story heroes. These situations can vary; they may be more or less positive (more or less remote from a normal or desired state), more or less evoking the engagement of other subjects.

For example, a situation may be construed as dangerous, or as desirable.

The second question is:

Do mental states attributed to symmetrical vs. asymmetrical field participants differ depending on the more or less positive situation of the heroes?

The third research problem is:

What is the function served by attributing consciousness to field subjects in the process of story-telling?

Subjects and research design

256 preschoolers (from families with secondary or higher education) were studied, 64 in each of four age groups (3;3 – 3;9, 4;3 – 4;9, 5;3 – 5;9 and 6;3 – 6;9).

The children recounted to peer listeners the adventures of the heroes in three picture books (A, B, C). The heroes, Jacek and Wacek, are the same in all the picture books. Three types of situation of the heroes Jacek and Wacek were represented in the story books:

- a situation of real danger (story book A),
- a situation of potential danger (story book B),
- a positive (desired) situation (story book C).

There were two versions of each picture book, the difference being the relationship between subjects portrayed in the forefront and in the background of the pictures. Each narrator recounted two adventures (A, B or A, C), one which happened in the presence of a peer (children in both forefront and background of the picture), and the other in the presence of a non-peer (children in an forefront and an adult in the background). The research design was balanced for age, gender and order of narration in the two experimental variants.

The investigation was conducted as an integral part of a sociodramatic play organized by the experimenter (E) in six nursery schools. A child in the narrator role constructed a narrative in conversation with another child in the role of "stage manager", who later directed the children who acted out the story. The narrative was thus the basis of the enacted story of the performance. Only the narrator had access to the story book pictures (the listener who was "stage manager" could not see them). What is important here is that the narrator was told by E that the story-book pictures show only a part of what happened to Jacek and Wacek. E said: "Not everything is shown in the pictures, because the artist didn't have time, but it is easy to guess how the adventure started, what happened, and what came afterward. But things like how the heroes felt and what they were thinking about can't be drawn in pictures. Still, they can be told about". And that was to be the task of the narrators.

Method of analysis and some results

Four steps of analysis will be presented below.

First analysis: Narrative line and narrative field subjects as concerns mental attributions

This analysis was to provide the basic distinctions between narrative line and narrative field subjects to whom the narrator attributed mental states. The analysis established which

subjects on the background of the picture were brought by the narrator into the narrative line and which remained as participants in the narrative field. We found that the narrative field is not a simple copy of what we perceive on the background of the picture. Even more interesting, we found that the action in the narrative line determined whether, and to what extent, subjects on the background were brought into the narrative line or were left only to participate in the narrative field.

The first result: A *dangerous situation* (story book A) evoked the engagement of the adult in the narrative line more frequently than the peer (45.31% and 14.06% respectively, $\chi^2 = 29.94$, $p < 0.001$). A *positive situation* (story book C), on the contrary, evoked the engagement of the peer in the narrative line more frequently than that of the adult (32.81% and 10.94% respectively, $\chi^2 = 8.96$, $p < 0.01$). The *situation of potential danger* (story book B) however did not differentiate the frequencies of subjects' engagement in the narrative line (29.69% for the adult, 31.25% for the peer) or their participation in the narrative field depending on the symmetry relation ($\chi^2 = 0.037$ n.s.).

The second result: Subjects on the background which were brought into the narrative line received far fewer attributions of mental states than those located in the narrative field (10.49% as compared to 63.14%). The remaining percents had no attribution of mental states.

Second analysis: Mental states attributed to narrative field subjects

This analysis focused only on mental states of narrative field subjects. These included the participants related to the heroes symmetrically as well as asymmetrically. Mental states were identified as follows: what participants know, think, or feel, or do not know, think or feel (after Bruner, 1986, p. 14) in reference to states and actions of narrative line subjects. We didn't observe any such attributions by three-year-old narrators. The analysis dealt only with narratives by 4–7 year-olds.

The results showed that field subjects (in 82.33% of all narratives by 4–7 year-olds) were ascribed states of consciousness which were attempts at interpretations of the content of the narrative line. These interpretations fell into five categories, now presented with examples.

A. Cause

a) causes of a given state of action by the heroes:

/1/ "Pan rybak sobie myśli, dlaczego Jacek i Wacek bawią się sami nad rzeką. Zgubili się mamusi?"

"The fisherman is wondering why Jacek and Wacek are playing alone beside the river. Did they lose their mummy?"

/2/ "Taki pan... pan myśli, że może Wacek zrobił kupę w majty i dlatego pływa... myje się w wodzie"

"That man ... is thinking that maybe Wacek dirtied his pants and that's why he's swimming ... he's washing himself in the water"

b) causes of absence of a desired state:

/3/ *"A mamusia nie wiedziała, dlaczego Jacek nie je śniadanka u babci..."*

"And mummy didn't know why Jacek is not eating breakfast at grandma's..."

/4/ *"Pani sobie pomyślała, co Jacek nie bawi się z Wackiem..., bo się z Wackiem pokłócił o patyka Jacek..."*

"The lady thought that Jacek isn't playing with Wacek..., 'cos Jacek quarrelled with Wacek over a stick."

B. Motive/goal of hero's action:

/5/ *"Chłopczyk na rowerku patrzy w Jacka i Jac... no... nie... Wacka... I nie wie, co oni chcą zrobić – nauczyć pieska pływać?"*

"The boy on the bicycle is looking at Jacek... and Jac... uh... no... Wacek... And (he) doesn't know what they want to do... teach the dog to swim?"

/6/ *"A siostrzyczka myśli i myśli... myśli i myśli, po co oni takie mają (skrzydła – przyp. B.B.) na plecach"*

"And the little sister thinks and thinks... thinks and thinks what have they got them (wings – B.B.) on their backs for"

C. Realization of the action plan (steps and manner of action):

/7/ *"No i taki chłopczyk nie wiedział, jak Jacek wyciągnie Wacka..."*

"And a boy didn't know how Jacek will pull Wacek out..."

/8/ *"No i dziewczynka się martwi, że on chyba słabo zamacha... słabo... zamacha w skrzydełka..."*

"And so the girl is worried that he won't wave (the wings) strong enough... he is waving the wings too lightly..."

D. Result of action:

/9/ *"Kasia wie, co Jacek doleci kawałek... tylko kawałek drogi..."*

"Kasia knows that Jacek will only fly a little way... just a little way..."

/10/ *"A chłopczyk się boi, że może Wacek nie wyciągnie z wody Jacka..."*

"And the boy is scared that maybe Wacek won't pull Jacek out of the water..."

E. Consequences of action (rewards and penalties for the agents)

/11/ *"Pan... ten... ten rybak to sobie myślał, czy chłopczyk nie będzie chory..."*

"He... he... that fisherman... he was wondering; will that boy be sick..."

/12/ *"A... pani wiedziała, co dzieci dostaną łanie za to latanie... dostaną łanie za to latanie... dostaną łanie..."*

"And... the lady knew that the children would get a spanking for that flying... a spanking for flying... a spanking..."

A comparative analysis was made of mental states attributed by narrators to symmetrical and asymmetrical participants in the narrative field. This analysis showed that narrators aged 4 to 7 seem to attribute a different optic to symmetrical and asymmetrical participants in reference to the actions in the narrative line.

Interpretations which were ascribed to adult participants observing the actions of Jacek and Wacek fall mainly into categories of causes (63.64%, 56.41% and 52.27% of all attributions by 4-5- and 6-year-olds, respectively) and consequences (about 30% of all attributions in each age group) of actions by heroes of the narrative line. Interpretations ascribed to peer observers of the action were mainly in categories of heroes' motives, action steps and action results, i.e., categories of episodic action (93.94%, 85.11% and 77.08% for 4-5- and 6-year-old narrators, respectively). In general, peer participants in the narrative field were interested in the purposeful organization of the heroes' activities in the narrative line. Figure 1 shows the frequencies of each mental state category.




Fig. 1. Categories of mental states attributed to narrative field subjects (child, adult)

Third analysis: The function of mental state attributions in story construction

One could say that narrators aged 4 to 7 impute to adult and peer participants in the narrative field different interpretations of what is happening in the narrative line. The adult seemed to be perceived as the personification of rules that are instilled in children in their upbringing. The presence of the adult in the narrative field inclines the narrator to clarify

- a) the causes and the consequences of rule breaking and
- b) consequences of desired behavior.

On the other hand the child is treated as a potential participant in the heroes' action (regardless of the kind of situation), and the presence of the child in the narrative field inclines the narrator to clarify the action itself and the possibility of reaching the intended result. It turned out that these differences in interpretation (in the landscape of consciousness) affected the course of the narrative line resulting in different elaborations of the semantic structure of stories, i.e., either of the external circumstances of the episode or of the plan of the episodic action.

What is to be noted is that

- a) Presentation of mental states attributed to asymmetrical participants (adults) in the narrative field is followed by elaboration of the external circumstances of the episode (see Example 1 in Appendix).
- b) Presentation of mental states attributed to symmetrical participants (children) in the narrative field is followed by elaboration of the plan of episodic action (see Example 2 in Appendix).

But in many cases presentation of mental states attributed to field participants did not lead to development of the narrative line. In fact, quite unexpectedly, depending on the attitude of the narrator to the interpretations attributed to field subjects, the narrative line was either developed in greater detail or not, as the following analysis shows.

Fourth analysis: Narrator's attitude to interpretations attributed to field subjects

If the narrator attributed to a field participant (regardless of symmetry) an incomplete or wrong interpretation of the action (from his own perspective), the effect was that the narrator produced an even fuller elaboration of the narrative line. For example:

A. Incomplete interpretation

"A mamusia nie wiedziała, dlaczego Jacek nie je śniadanka u babci... A to było tak, co Jacek poszedł do babci... do pokoju. No... drzwi były zamknięte, no to wyszedł naaaaa... dwór, i nie zjadł śniadanka... u... u babci"

"And mummy didn't know why Jacek is not eating breakfast at grandma's... And it was like this, that Jacek went to grandma's... room. Uh... the door was shut, so he went out... outside, and didn't have breakfast at... at grandma's"

B. Wrong interpretation (totally or partially) from the narrator's perspective

- a) *"A Jasiek już wie, że Jacek za patyk Wacka wyciąga, nie łapą. Jasiek (śmiech) myśli, co już wie... co patykiem... (ironicznie)
A nie! Jacek... Wacka... Wacka łapą wyciągał...
Tak sobie (dziecko przykłęka pokazując) nad rzeką i potem wyciągał trochę łapę... a potem tak daleko... daleko... do Wacka, co by go wyciągnąć"*

"And Jasiek already knows that Jacek will pull Wacek out with the stick, and not by (pulling) his paw. Jasiek (with a laugh) thinks that he already knows that it's... with a stick... (ironically)

No! Jacek... pulled Wacek... Wacek out with his paw... This way (the child kneels down to show how) beside the river and then he stretched out his paw a little bit... and then farther and farther... to (reach) Wacek, to pull him out"

- b) *"Taki pan... pan myśli, że może Wacek zrobił kupę w majty i dlatego pływa... myje się w wodzie
Ale Wacek się wywalił i wpadł do wody... A potem to zrobił kupę w majty i boi się wyjść..."*

"That man ... is thinking that maybe Wacek dirtied his pants and that's why he's swimming ... he's washing himself in the water:

But Wacek fell down and fell into the water... And then he dirtied his pants and he's scared to come out"

In the above cases, the narrator completed, negated or modified field subjects' interpretations of the action (of course, attributed by himself to them). He then introduced the "true" representation of what was going on. In this way he made a shift from the landscape of consciousness, that is, action representation in the minds of narrative field subjects, to the landscape of real, ongoing action.

In many other cases, the narrator confined himself to presenting mental states attributed to field subjects without completing, negating or modifying these interpretations of the action. In these cases he did not transfer the content of mental states to the action landscape. One could say that the narrator not always felt sure of what was really going on, so he developed the course of the story only in terms of the landscape of consciousness.

C. Possible interpretations

*"Jacek fruwał jak duży motyl. Fruwał sam... bez Wacka.
Pani sobie pomyślała, co Jacek nie bawi się z Wackiem..., bo się z Wackiem pokłócił o patyka Jacek.
A Jacek fruwał sam. Fruwał i fruwał"*

*"Jacek was flying like a big butterfly. (He) was flying alone... without Wacek.
The lady thought that Jacek isn't playing with Wacek..., 'cos Jacek quarrelled with Wacek over a stick.
And Jacek was flying alone. (He) was flying and flying"*

Sometimes the narrator verbalized his attitude to field subjects' interpretations of the heroes' action. He recognized that each of them was possible but not certain, including his own interpretation. For example:

"Jacek fruwał"

Wacek myślał, co Jacek ruszał nogami i skrzydłami...

A dziewczynka to myślała, że Jacek tylko w skrzydełka mach... mach robił.

Nie wiadomo. Tak myślę, co może ruszał nogami na początek, a potem tylko na skrzydełkach mach robił i... mach. Nie wiadomo. No i fruwał"

"Jacek was flying.

Wacek thought that Jacek was waving his legs and wings...

And the girl thought that Jacek was only waving his wings mach... and mach.

We don't know. I think that maybe he was waving his legs at first and then he was waving only his wings mach... and mach. We don't know.

And he was flying"

For the narrator who wasn't sure of the course of changing story reality one possible strategy was: to develop the narration line only in terms of the landscape of consciousness (in the minds of field participants as well as in the mind of the narrator).

Figure 2 shows interpretations attributed to field subjects by 4- to 7-year-olds depending on the narrator's attitude to these interpretations.




Fig. 2. Narrator's attitude to interpretations attributed to field subjects

The most frequent mental state attributions observed in 4-year-olds was an incomplete interpretation of the action (96.36% of all attributions). The narrator ascribed to the given field subject an open question, which he then answered himself. These ques-

tions opened new categories of information to be supplied. This means that subjects' questions comprised frameworks within which the narrator produced new information elaborating the story. Either they produced next steps of the action, or they returned to past steps, or else they went beyond immediate action into future results and consequences.

As for the older narrators, their incomplete interpretations attributed to field subjects were less frequent (55.81% for 5-year-olds and 31.52% for 6-year-olds)* and took a much more mature form. They posed the problem in "yes/no" questions, preceded by mental verbs: "think" or "not know". The questions themselves were formulations of action states: "Did (will) something happen or not?" The narrator followed up these questions by placing them in the landscape of action, by confirming or negating the proposition contained in the question. In both the above cases, the narrator satisfied the request for information (as the omniscient and omnipresent story-teller, i.e., the one who knows everything and who is everywhere (versus the "naive" narrative field subject).

In 5- and 6-year-olds we observed a new form of attributing mental states, i.e., attributing wrong interpretations, of course from the narrator's perspective (33.72% and 40.22% respectively, $z = 0.90$ n.s.). These were either totally wrong or partly wrong, and were either negated or modified in the landscape of action (in the course of the story).

Sometimes they took a playful form negating each and every interpretation until finally an accepted presentation of what was going on was made. This seemed to be an exercise in taking new perspectives and confronting them with the narrator's omniscient knowledge of the story line.

In 5- and 6-year-olds we also noted another new strategy of mental state attribution. The narrator presented possible but not certain interpretations of the action (an increase from 10.47% for 5-year-olds to 28.26% for 6-year-olds, $z = 3.08$, $p < 0.001$). Since the real course of action was, in fact, unknown, the listener has to discover it, using one or another interpretation by field subjects or else using an uncertain interpretation from the narrator – now presenting himself as non-omniscient and non-omnipresent in relation to the action.

Discussion

A critical feature of narratives, noted by Greimas & Courtes (1976) and developed by Bruner (1986), is the subjectivity of story characters. This means that any developed narrative must have a double landscape:

- one of the action
- the other of consciousness
 - a) in the minds of story characters – subjects of the narrative line (heroes) and subjects of the narrative field (participants), and
 - b) in the mind of the narrator as well.

This paper has been concerned with states of consciousness which young narrators (aged 4 to 7) ascribe to field participants in reference to the heroes' actions. It turned out that child narrators impute to field participants either causal or teleological interpretations of heroes'

* A decrease from 96,36% for 4-year-olds to 55,81% for 5-year-olds ($z = 6,20$, $p < 0,000...$), and from 55,81% for 5-year-olds to 31,52% for 6-year-olds ($z = 3,36$, $p < 0,0004$).

action, depending on the asymmetrical-symmetrical relationship between field and line subjects (Bokus, 1996b). Further it turned out that, depending on the narrator's attitude to the interpretations attributed to field subjects, the narrator either developed the narrative line in greater detail in the landscape of action or rather developed the narrative line only in terms of landscape of consciousness.

I put here the question formulated by Lucariello in 1990: What provokes a child into elaboration of landscape of consciousness in the narrative text? What moves the child from the mere exposition or rendering of the occurrence of actions to an introduction of character subjectivity or mind in relation to action? (Lucariello, 1990, p. 133). How can this question be answered?

In the light of our studies, the narrator uses field subjects' minds to understand the course of changes in referenced reality, to better explain states and actions in the narrative line. The narrator takes different perspectives which he or she attributes to those story characters who are located in the narrative field. Making other persons think about the story forces the narrator to incorporate their perspectives.

The narrator uses field participants' perspectives in two ways:

Firstly – he uses field subjects' states of consciousness in order to present his own (the "true") representation of the heroes' action. The narrator elaborates the landscape of action in response to previous elaboration of the landscape of consciousness. By doing this he plays the role of omniscient and omnipresent storyteller (Lucariello, 1990). He is directly in touch with the ontology of the story;

Secondly – the narrator, who is not quite sure what was going on in the story, uses field subjects' perspectives to depict the fictional world through the eyes of the characters. In such a case the narrator elaborates the action only in terms of the landscape of consciousness, so the listener is not told how things are but how they seem to be. The narrator presents a possible, not a certain, reality of the story ("subjunctive reality" in Bruner's terms, Bruner, 1986).

We have shown how children acquire competence in these fundamental processes of story building through their own narrational activity.

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Appendix

Example 1

J.G. (5;8) *Jacek i Wacek grali w piłkę. Nad rzeką grali.
I wpadł do wody Wacek. I piłka wleciała potem.
I Jacek ... ten żółty to Jacek? (do słuchacza)*

Jacek (z naciskiem)

I Jacek wyciągał Wacka.

*A pan ratownik wod ... wodowy, co pływa w wodzie,
pan ratownik pomagał wyciągać Wacka.*

*A pan rybak widział z góry, że pan ratownik
już ratuje. I sobie myślał:*

"Dlaczego dzieci są nad rzeką bez mamusi.

Uciekli mamusi?"

*A to było tak. Tomek chciał pokazać żabki dla Wacka... i Jacka
nad rzeką. Mamusia nie dała iść nad rzekę.*

No to uciekli mamusi. I polecieli.

Nie znaleźli Tomka. Nie znaleźli żabki. Ale była tam piłka..

I grali. Znaleźli piłkę i grali.

I co?

I wpadł do wody Wacek.

Ale pan ratownik go wyratował.

Ale potem był Wacek trochę chory.

Jacek and Wacek were playing ball.

They were playing by the river.

And Wacek fell into the water. And the ball fell in after

And Jacek ... the yellow one that's Jacek? (to listener)

Jacek (emphatically)

And Jacek was pulling Wacek out.

And Mister Lifeguard wat... the waterman that swims in the water,

Mister Lifeguard helped pull Wacek out.

*And Mister Fisherman saw from up above that Mister Lifeguard is already
saving (him). And he was thinking:*

*"Why are the children at the river without (their) Mommy. They ran away from
(their) Mommy?"*

*And it was like this. Tomek wanted to show froggies for Wacek and Jacek
(= to Wacek and Jacek) ... at the river.*

They couldn't get Mommy to go the river.

So they ran away from Mommy. And they ran off.

They didn't find Tomek.

They didn't find any froggies. But there was a ball there.

And they played. They found a ball and played.

And (then) what?

And he fell into the water, Wacek (did).

But Mister Lifeguard saved him.

But afterward Wacek was a little bit sick.

Example 2

Z.S. (5;4) *Był sobie Jacek i Wacek....
 Nad rzeką... się...no bawili piłką.
 I jeden wpadł do wody z piłką.
 A drugi wyciągał.
 No i taki chłopczyk stanął i...i...
 I nie wiedział, jak Jacek.... wyciągnie Wacka, jak ...
 No Jacek... Jacek ciągnął za łapę Wacka.
 No i nie mógł.
 I Jacek wtedy poszukał kija i ... i...
 I ... no... dał kija... dał kija do trzymania dla Wacka.
 No i wyciągał Wacka.
 A żabki i piesek się cieszyły.
 No i... wyciągnął Wacka.
 Ale Wacek był potem chory.*

*Once there was Jacek and Wacek.
 Beside the river...they...so they were playing ball.
 And one fell into the water with the ball.
 And the other was pulling (him) out.
 And a boy was standing (there)... and ...and...
 And he didn't know how Jacek.... will pull Wacek out, how ...
 Well, Jacek... Jacek pulled Wacek's paw.
 But he couldn't.
 And then Jacek looked for a stick and... and...
 And... uh ... he gave the stick to Wacek to hold.
 So then he was pulling Wacek out.
 And the frogs and ... and the doggie were glad.
 So he pulled Wacek out.
 But afterward Wacek was sick.*